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Abstract: Existentialists such as Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sar-
tre have offered some interesting responses to the skeptical problem of 
other minds. However, their contributions are sometimes overlooked 
in the analytic study of this problem. A traditional view may think the 
existentialists focus on the ethical issues among conscious minds and 
take for granted that individuals’ experiences are within a world with 
others. This paper aims to identify and reconstruct two transcendental 
arguments on other minds from Heidegger’s and Sartre’s philosophy. I 
argue that their arguments are strong enough to ward off skeptics and 
suggest that their existential starting points and methodologies might 
be our best way out of the puzzle. 
Introduction 
About four hundred years ago, René Descartes wrote his well-
known Meditations on First Philosophy, in which many modern skeptical 
problems can find their foundations. The conclusions of Descartes’ os-
tensibly sound reasoning have been detrimental to our understanding of 
other minds. The problem of other minds claims that we should be skep-
tical about other consciousness because we lack evidence: we can-
not rule out the possibility that our fellow human-like beings are not ro-
bots or zombies. Existentialists offer some interesting responses to this 
problem. Some commentators argue that existentialists “take for 
granted” that individuals’ experiences are within a world.1 Thus, they do 
not offer arguments against the skeptics. However, I argue that alt-
hough they focus on issues “after” the existence of other minds, such as 
one’s relationship with the world or the others, existentialists do have 
solid transcendental arguments for the existence of other minds. I 
will first introduce the skeptical problem. Then I will discuss Mar-
tin Heidegger’s and Jean-Paul Sartre’s argument in length. After de-
scribing each philosopher’s argument, I will defend them against some 
critics.  
 
1 Anita Avramides, “Other Minds,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Stanford: Stan-




I. The Problem of Other Minds  
The problem of other minds comes from a Cartesian starting point 
that we should only accept clear and distinct knowledge. There might be 
other things we take ourselves to know; however, we should remain 
skeptical about them until we have evidence or justification. Admittedly, 
skepticism is only a methodological tool Descartes used; however, this 
way of thinking becomes foundational in philosophy. This starting point 
is modest, easy to understand, and intuitively attractive. However, it is 
also problematic because it sets a low standard for doubt but a high 
standard for knowledge. To grant everything the skeptics want, we 
would lose our history, induction, empirical world, and, most relevantly, 
the existence of other minds. Although it can secure a solid foundation 
of knowledge, the high “false positive rate” seems to be too high a price 
to pay. Thus, most philosophers, including the existentialist I will dis-
cuss, aim to solve the problem instead of giving in to the skeptics.   
The problem of other minds is based on the commonly accepted be-
lief that we do have evidence of our own consciousness, but we do not 
have evidence for others’ consciousness. The evidence we use is the di-
rect access to our mental activities, which we do not have to other peo-
ple. The skeptics ask how we can tell between a conscious being and a 
highly sophisticated robot without this subjective evidence. If we can-
not answer this question, we cannot know that our lively fellow beings 
are conscious minds. This conditional suggests that we need to accept 
the possibility that I am the only conscious being in the universe, which 
is unsettling because, in our everyday life, we do not, to the least extent, 
question the consciousness of our fellow beings. How can we answer the 
skeptics to defend our everyday life experience?   
Before I delve into the existentialists’ response, I wish to 
briefly state the most common and intuitive response from the analytic 
tradition, the analogy argument. This argument “cites similarities be-
tween two things and uses this as support for concluding that further 
similarities may be taken to exist.”2 We know that we are similar to our 
fellow beings in almost all aspects. For example, we look like the same 
animal; we speak languages; we have similar genes. Thus, by induction, 
we can conclude that we have good reasons to believe that others are 
 
2 Ibid, 6. 
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indeed conscious beings just like us. Next, I will introduce Heidegger’s 
responses.   
 
II. Heidegger’s Transcendental Response  
Before describing Heidegger’s responses to the problem of other 
minds, I wish first to introduce a central concept of Martin Heidegger’s 
philosophy–Dasein. In German, “da-” means “there,” and “sein” means  
“being.” Heidegger suggests that “by Dasein we mean that entity in its 
Being which we know as human life.”3 Wheeler suggests that “we might 
conceive of [Dasein] as Heidegger’s term for the distinctive kind of en-
tity that human beings as such are.”4 Heidegger offers descriptions of 
Dasein; however, this term cannot be easily defined, which invites dif-
ferent interpretations. In this paper, I will evaluate two interpretations 
of Dasein, disagreeing on whether each Dasein corresponds to one hu-
man being or one human community.   
Depending on the interpretations, Heidegger could have two re-
sponses to the problem of other minds. On one interpreta-
tion, “Dasein” is individual, each corresponding to one person. A 
Dasein would mean the special existence of one human person. Accord-
ing to this interpretation, Heidegger would need to argue for the exist-
ence of other minds. On another interpretation, “Dasein” is collective, 
each corresponding to a community, where individuals are only “cases 
of Dasein.” A Dasein would mean the special existence of a human com-
munity. According to this interpretation, intersubjectivity is presup-
posed in a community, granting other minds’ existence for free. I argue 
for the first interpretation because the second one may be overly gener-
ous when granting consciousness for one’s participation within a com-
munity. Thus, Heidegger does have an adequate response to the skeptics 
instead of taking intersubjectivity for granted.  
Heidegger first shows the existence of other non-beings, including 
the tools and objects in our everyday life. In his lecture, The Concept of 
Time, Heidegger claimed that “[Dasein] is grounded in a fundamental 
possibility of its Being.”5 The possibility of Dasein’s being refers to the 
 
3 Martin Heidegger, The Concept of Time, trans. William McNeill, 6E. 
4 Michael Wheeler, “Martin Heidegger,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Stanford: 
Stanford University, Fall 2020). 
5 Heidegger, The Concept of Time, 10E. 
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futural possibility we have in life: what I can do in the future, what might 
happen to me in the future, and so forth. Heidegger argues that human 
existence is essentially grounded in possibility. The possibility is essen-
tial for Dasein because the concept of possibility brings Dasein tempo-
rality, which roots Dasein’s existence. Here I offer an illustration: before 
I toss a coin, I have both possibilities: heads and tails. Once that coin is 
tossed, one of the possibilities is manifested and the other lost. With dif-
ferent possibilities, one can distinguish different moments in time and 
therefore derive temporality. Without time, Dasein cannot exist. 
Heidegger thinks that the determination of possibility brings us time, 
and having undetermined possibilities brings us future. In general, pos-
sibility, time, and existence are closely connected in Heidegger’s philos-
ophy. I argue that possibility as an essence of Dasein can help Heidegger 
achieve the existence of other minds.    
Where do the possibilities come from? Can I form possibilities 
alone in my mind? I argue that I cannot. Please note that on day 
one, Heidegger characterizes Dasein as being-in-the-world.6 The solip-
sistic Dasein is only a thought experiment, offering a reductio ad absur-
dum for the external world’s existence instead of taking the external 
world for granted. Suppose solipsism is true, and I am the only existing 
thing, then there would be no other being, either Dasein or non-Dasein. 
Nothing can distinguish one moment from the other because there is 
nothing on which I can count to know the time. Dasein must receive 
possibilities instead of creating them. I propose an illustration: when I 
flip a coin, I have two possible results: heads or tails. When I flip two 
coins, I have three possible results: two heads, one of each, and two 
tails. And so forth. The more coins I can toss, the more possible results 
I have. Although my Dasein has to do the flipping, which is analogous 
to moving forward in time, some objects must be outside of my Dasein, 
representing different results to create possibilities for my 
Dasein. Moreover, to account for all the possibilities we have in life, 
countless objects outside of ourselves need to exist.  By flipping 
those “coins,” my Dasein gains its temporality. Now imagine a world 
with no “coins” to toss; I would have no possibilities at all. Even worse, 
I would have no determinacy either. The situation is similar to how I 
have no possibilities after my death when my Dasein no longer exists. In 
 
6 Ibid, 7E. 
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short, Dasein cannot exist alone because it would lose its possibil-
ity. Dasein must exist as a “being-in-the-world.”   
The next step is to argue for other minds’ existence based on the 
existence of other objects. We are “being-with” other beings in the 
world who holds the same relation to the world as we do. 
Heidegger claims that “being-with is an existential constituent of being-
in-world.”7 My “being-with” is essential to my “being-in-the-world” be-
cause our involvement with instruments or objects always comes back 
to other beings. When we see an object, we always relate it with some 
persons. Heidegger offers some examples: “the field along which we 
stroll ‘outside’ shows itself as belonging to so-and-so keeping it in good 
order; the book I make use of is one I purchased at..., received as a gift 
from..., and the like.”8 The existence of others is already implied in the 
shared world. Thus, the others always arise from the objects.   
One may argue that what if I venture to a yet undiscovered island 
and dig 100 yards underground for a stone that nobody has ever seen 
before. How can that stone be related to anybody else in the world? 
Heidegger could argue that, although nobody interacted with that stone 
directly, others still arise from the objects because I cannot complete 
the discovery alone. In this example, the boat which carries me to the 
island is made by some person; the tools I use are designed by someone 
else; the mining method I use is probably invented by yet another per-
son, and so on. Also, even when I am alone, I have to use language or to 
think conceptually, to carry out my “project.” I cannot invent languages 
or concepts alone. Moreover, these activities, e.g., inventing, cannot be 
done by objects; instead, they must be done by other “being-in-
world,” who has the same relation to the world just as we do. Heidegger 
claims that “the world essential to being-there releases beings not just 
different from instruments and things of any kind, but ones that, in ac-
cordance with the way they have their being as being-there, are them-
selves ‘in’ the world in the manner [earlier described] of being-in-
world.”9 Because other people have the same relation with the world as 
we do, they are also Dasein. Other people must have the consciousness 
to be Dasein. Thus, the problem of other minds is solved.  
 
7 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time: An Annotated Translation, trans. Cyril Welch, un-
published manuscript, January 2017, 158. 
8 Ibid, 149. 
9 Ibid, 150. 
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Besides, Heidegger points out our experience of “absence.” Some-
times we can feel the lack of another person when we feel alone. Russell 
and Reynolds argue that “such an experience cannot be generated by 
some external object, since there is no external object to provoke 
it.”10 For example, a gun can provoke my fear; a great lake can gener-
ate my awe. However, my experience of loneliness cannot be gener-
ated by any object. “A disappointed anticipation of others”11 can only ex-
ist if the structure of my being wants something while that wish is unful-
filled, i.e., my “being-with.” Thus, other minds must exist. These are the 
arguments from the individual perspective.    
 
III. The Collective Interpretation of Dasein  
The community also plays a role in Heidegger’s response 
to the problem of other minds. A collective Dasein corresponds to a hu-
man community, which “contains an inherent form of intersubjectivity 
to which we must ‘return’ in order to achieve authenticity.”12 K. M. 
Stroh argues that Heidegger does not limit the number of people related 
to one Dasein: “[Dasein is] this entity which each of us is himself.”13 At 
least one person corresponds to one Dasein; however, an entire commu-
nity of people may also correspond to one Dasein. One benefit of this 
interpretation is that it captures both the individual and communal per-
spectives of persons.14 This interpretation presupposes that other “cases 
of Dasein” in our community are also conscious beings just like 
us. Thus, other minds are presupposed in Heidegger’s argument. I ar-
gue against Stroh’s interpretation because we cannot rule out non-con-
sciousness within our community to be “cases of Dasein.” If Heidegger 
presupposes other minds in Dasein, unwelcomed consequences will fol-
low.  
I wish to offer an illustration with a somewhat contentious and non-
conventional presupposition. My goal is to show that potential problems 
similar to what I will describe below only apply to the “top-
 
10 Matheson Russell and Jack Reynolds, “Transcendental Arguments about Other 
Minds and Intersubjectivity,” Philosophy Compass 6, no. 5 (2011), 304, doi:10.1111/j.1747-
9991.2011.00394.x. 
11 Ibid. 
12 K. M. Stroh, “Intersubjectivity of Dasein in Heidegger’s Being and Time: How Au-
thenticity is a Return to Community,” Human Studies 38, no. 2 (Jul 01, 2015), 243. 
doi:10.1007/s10746-015-9341-9. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24757333. 
13 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time 27/7, qtd. in Stroh, 246. 
14 Stroh, 246. 
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down” interpretation of Dasein, where one assumes intersubjectivity 
within a community and distinguishes those having consciousness from 
the rest. As technology develops, we have evidence that some “non-
Dasein” can also partake in our linguistic and epistemic life. I can ask 
my phone about the weather. I have to talk to a robot for five minutes 
every time I call customer service. Some software can call places such as 
restaurants or barbershops to make appointments without being noticed 
as non-persons. I take for granted that computers do participate in our 
linguistic community. As technology develops, we will have to incorpo-
rate them into our philosophy. However, computers do not have con-
sciousness. How can we rule “Siri” or “Alexa” out of being a case of 
Dasein? If each Dasein corresponds to one person, we can have the 
equipment or other non-Dasein within our linguistic or epistemic com-
munity. However, if a linguistic community corresponds to one Dasein 
and we take Dasein’s intersubjectivity within such community for 
granted, we also need to take the consciousness of “Siri” in that pack-
age. One possible way out is to argue that Siri does not have Dasein’s 
features, e.g., temporality. However, if we try to separate “cases of non-
Dasein” out carefully, we need to repeat Heidegger’s argument for 
Dasein on “cases of Dasein,” which dissolves the distinction.   
At least in my arguments described in section II, Heidegger only 
argues for other minds’ existence. However, a perfect method to distin-
guish non-Dasein from Dasein is unnecessary. It would be acceptable to 
have “Siri” involved in our community as part of our “being-in-the-
world.” However, it would be less so acceptable to have “Siri” in 
our “being-with.” I acknowledge that my presupposition that “Siri” is 
part of our linguistic community could be contentious. However, this 
illustration only aims to show that “the bottom-up interpretation of 
Dasein,” i.e., defining each individual as a “Dasein” and then give a tran-
scendental argument for the existence of other minds, is less problematic 
than assuming intersubjectivity by interpreting Dasein as a community.  
In brief, I have argued that Heidegger did not take other minds for 
granted. He could derive other minds from the concepts of possibilities, 
which is required for the mere existence of Dasein. Furthermore, I ar-
gued against the interpretation that Dasein is collective of an unwel-
comed consequence that non-consciousness can also be a case of 
Dasein. However, is Heidegger’s argument the best one ever? Does it 
capture everything we want as an answer to the problem of other 
minds? A further defense of Heidegger is beyond the scope of this 
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paper. For example, another existentialist, Jean-Paul Sartre, 
thinks Heidegger’s argument is unsatisfactory, whose argument I will 
discuss in the next section.  
 
IV. Sartre’s Shame Argument  
Heidegger is criticized for “his lack of discussion of how the body 
functions in this being-in-the-world.”15 Although he does argue for the 
existence of other minds, his account of our relations with one another, 
viz., “being-with,” seems inadequate. According to Heidegger’s descrip-
tion, our relations with another being are rather detached because “be-
ing-with” is only “an existential constituent” of our relationship with the 
world. Do I have to “be with” another being? Why cannot I and other 
beings have a more direct relationship? Sartre argues the existence of 
other minds with the concept of the look.   
Imagine that I am captivated by something behind a closed door, 
peering through the keyhole. No one is around me. The corridor is quiet 
and empty. I am so curious that I peer and listen with my full attention. 
I give no thoughts about my stance, my environment, or my belongings 
around me. As Sartre puts it, “my consciousness sticks to my acts.” Sud-
denly, I hear footsteps in the hall, and I realize that someone is looking 
at me. The thought of myself as an object irrupts into my consciousness. 
I am being seen! I suddenly feel ashamed for my action because of the 
look that other person gives me.16 Sartre argues that our emotions, such 
as shame, require a subject to “look” at us. There must be another con-
sciousness to teach me to look at myself as an object because we do not 
look at ourselves on a pre-reflective level. Guignon and Pereboom claim 
that “my ‘inner’ experience of shame is something I can discover only 
through the look of another person, for shame necessarily involves see-
ing myself as another sees me.”17 Without other consciousness to look at 
me, I would never learn the experience of shame.  
There are two ways of looking at ourselves: as an object, in-itself, or 
as a subject, for-itself. When I was peering through the keyhole, my con-
 
15 M. E. Peters, “Heidegger’s Embodied Others: On Critiques of the Body and ‘intersub-
jectivity’ in Being and Time,” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18, no. 2 (Apr 15, 
2019), 444. doi:10.1007/s11097-018-9580-0. 
16 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Barnes, Hazel, (Washington Square 
Press, 1993), 259. 
17 Charles Guignon and Derk Pereboom, “Sartre,” in Existentialism: Basic Writings, (Indi-
anapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2001), 273. 
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sciousness focused on that thing behind the locked door. I am aware of 
my consciousness; however, this awareness is for myself: I explore the 
world for my curiosity as if I am not part of this world. When I noticed 
that somebody is looking at me, my self-awareness suddenly changed 
into the objective form. I am aware of myself as an object in another 
person’s eyes: I act as if I am only a part of the external world for another 
consciousness. I am the consciousness inside the object of me. These 
two ways of looking at oneself are necessary for our existence, and a 
transcendental argument for the consciousness of other minds arises out 
of these necessities. If we are the only consciousness in the universe, we 
would not have looked at ourselves as objects. In order for us to be 
an “in-itself,” there needs to be at least another “for-itself,” who can look 
at me and “demand” me to be the object. One may wonder what if the 
other person looking at me is just another in-itself, e.g., a human-like 
robot. Guignon and Pereboom argue that in-itself cannot teach me the 
concept of shame. The other person must present herself as “a conscious 
and free subject who is capable of interpreting and evaluating what [she] 
sees.”18 I am aware that the other person can evaluate my voyeuristic ac-
tivity so that I can feel shame. Thus, if we try to look for other minds as 
the subjective consciousness ourselves, it would be hard to find other 
minds; however, once we realize our objective aspect of self-awareness, 
we can easily see that another consciousness must exist for the mere pos-
sibility of our existence.   
Russell and Reynolds consider an interesting counterargument that 
we could be mistaken about another person’s look and still feel 
shame.19 For example, the footsteps I hear in the hall come from another 
closed room. I can still feel shame even if no consciousness is around. A 
look from a consciousness happens to exist on most occasions when I 
feel certain emotions; however, it might not be necessary. Thus, Sartre’s 
example of shame cannot prove other minds’ existence because it lacks 
necessity.   
Sartre could respond that “our feeling of vulnerability before the 
Look of the Other is actually far from dissipated.”20 It is unnecessary for 
us to feel ashamed, proud, or afraid every time we encounter another 
consciousness. However, this illustrates a structural need for our exist-
 
18 Ibid. 
19 Russell and Reynolds, 306. 
20 Ibid. 
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ence. Although it is possible that we sometimes feel certain emotions, 
e.g., shame, with no other consciousness around, it is impossible that we 
can feel shame without ever encountering another consciousness. There 
have to be some other minds who teach me to the concepts of shame 
before I can even make any mistakes. Thus, in order to explain some of 
our emotions, there must be other consciousness.   
One may argue that Sartre’s argument is inadequate to ward off the 
skeptics because Sartre admits that the problem of Other-as-object is 
insoluble. They may quote Sartre for claiming “no proof is possible, no 
reasons can be provided, no argument can be mounted to ward off sol-
ipsism, if we are limited to the Other-as-object, since ‘the Other on prin-
ciple...is outside my experience.’”21 However, I have to disagree with this 
reading of Sartre because he offers so much more argument on other 
minds’ existence. Instead of giving in to the skeptics, I think Sartre crit-
icizes how the skeptical question is posed. He claims that “each look 
makes us prove concretely–and in the indubitable certainty of the co-
gito–that we exist for all living men; that is, that there are (some) con-
sciousnesses for whom I exist.”22 He points out that the cartesian start-
ing point is not the only method to gain certainty of our knowledge. I 
think this is because the cartesian starting point focuses only on the sub-
jective or for-itself part of our self-consciousness; however, this is an in-
adequate view for Sartre. Each look that another person gives, trying to 
win over me to be the subject, is assuring enough for me to know that I 
exist as an object for them. Thus, I can know they are conscious. How-
ever, if we think the only possible way to ward off skeptics is to ac-
cess others’ mental activity directly, we fell into the skeptic’s trap. 
 
Conclusion 
In her entry Other Minds of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy, Anita Avramides claims that Heidegger’s question is “how can we 
explain/understand the structures of the being of subjectivity in such a 
way as to include the world and others,” while Sartre’s question is “how 
do I encounter the Other.”23 Although I agree that Heidegger focuses on 
the structure of being including others, and Sartre focuses on the 
 
21 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 251, qtd. in Alec Hyslop, “Sartre and Other 
Minds,” Sartre Studies International 6, no. 1 (Jan 01, 2000), 50. 
doi:10.3167/135715500782368540. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23512944. 
22 Sartre, 281. 
23 Avramides, 21-22. 
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structure of being encountering others, I do not think this is a fair sum-
marization of the existentialists’ effort on this traditionally analytic puz-
zle. The transcendental method Heidegger and Sartre use, i.e., to argue 
for other minds’ existence from our existence’s very structure, is strong 
enough to answer the skeptical question.  
Recall the traditional analytic arguments from analogy. They are al-
ways unsatisfactory because an analogy from descriptions leaves the es-
sential difference between conscious and non-conscious beings un-
touched, which is the distinctive conscious structure of existence. Alt-
hough existentialists may disagree on our existence’s best description, 
they share the correct starting point and methodology. We can only 
ward off the skeptics by arguing that we cannot exist in the way we do 
without other minds. When the skeptics are willing to pay prices as high 
as other minds, the only leverage we have left will be our existence. 
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